

The Institutional Arrangements and Paradox of Central Government's Evaluation on Local Governments' Performance in Taiwan: A Case of Social Welfare Evaluation System

Yen-Ju Lee

Assistant professor, Department of Public Management and Policy, Tunghai
University

Tien-Shen Li

Assistant professor, Department of Social and Public Affairs, University of
Taipei

Yin-Ping Lau

Assistant professor, Department of Social Work, Fu Jen Catholic University

Guang-Xu Wang

Corresponding author; Professor, Department of Public Administration and
Management, National University of Tainan

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to systematically explore the institutional arrangements and paradox of the “Social Welfare Policy Planning and Control and Assessment” since 2001. Here are the suggestions from this research: (1) regarding local governors in ignorance of the social welfare, it is necessary to get back to the basics of democratic election mechanism through which people can show their discontent with their votes; (2) concerning the cost of competition, deregulation may be a good idea, which means the central government can appropriately reduce the range and the intensity of the evaluation; (3) in order to avoid the Matthew Effect

which could negatively affect the rights and interests of the people, the central government may set up funds for financially disadvantaged local governments to apply as project subsidies, which may well make up for the gaps in general grants. The research results can provide a reference for policy formulation.

Keywords: Local Government, Social Welfare, Social Welfare Policy Planning and Control and Assessment, Deregulation, Performance Management